BANKRUPTCY-ABANDONMENT-TRUSTEE

IN BANKRUPTCY MAY

NOT ABANDON BURDENSOME PROPERTY OF DEBTOR'S ESTATE
IN CONTRAVENTION

OF

STATE

AND LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION LAWS-In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d

912 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 105 S. Ct. 1168

(1985).
Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (1978
Act)' permits the trustee in bankruptcy 2 to abandon' "any property of the [debtor's] estate that is burdensome. . . [or] of inconsequential value to the estate." 4 Unlike state and local
environmental protection legislation,5 however, the Federal
I Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2603
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)), amended by Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 93-353, 98 Stat. 333.
See Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275 (1980),
for a succinct overview of earlier bankruptcy acts.
2 Previously, under section 70(a) of Title 11, title to the debtor's property
vested in the trustee in bankruptcy. See 4

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

554-57 (L. King 15th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

COLLIER].

554.02[2], at
See generally 4A

70.11, at 114.1-18 (L. King 14th ed. 1978) [hereinafter

cited as 4A COLLIER] (detailed discussion of former § 70(a) and its legislative history). The trustee was deemed "a transferee by operation of law. He [was] not a
bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer, but [took] the bankrupt's property in the
plight in which he [found] it." Id. 1 70.42, at 499-500. By virtue of section 551 of
Title 11 to the 1978 Act, which defines property of the bankruptcy estate, the
trustee no longer takes title to the debtor's property, "but instead acquires a controlling interest in it." 4 COLLIER, supra, $ 554.02[2], at 554-57.
3 Property may be abandoned by the trustee "to any party with a possessory
554.02[2], at 554-58. Abandonment irinterest" in it. 4 COLLIER, supra note 2,
revocably dispossesses the trustee of any interest in the property abandoned. Id.;
see In re Enriquez, 22 Bankr. 934, 935-36 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982) (trustee cannot
recoup interest in abandoned property regardless of subsequent increases in
value); In re Torpley, 4 Bankr. 145, 146 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (exception to
rule that abandonment is irrevocable). Abandonment, however, does not divest the
debtor of his interest in the property. See In re Tyler, 15 Bankr. 258, 260 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Motley, 10 Bankr. 141, 145 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981).
4 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982). Section 554(a) of the 1978 provides that "[aifter
notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is
burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate." Id. Section 554(a) was amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 93-353, 98 Stat. 333, to include property that is "of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C.A. § 554(a) (West Cum. Supp.
1985) (emphasis added). So long as there is no objection to abandonment, the
trustee may disclaim the property absent court approval. In re Trim-X, Inc., 695
F.2d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing In re Motley, 10 Bankr. 141 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1981); In re Peninsula Roofing & Sheet Metal, 9 Bankr. 257 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1981)).
5 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:IE-1 to -116 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985);
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6
bankruptcy scheme does not contemplate the trustee's disposal
of property of the debtor's estate that also constitutes hazardous
waste.7 In an attempt to resolve the conflict between the trustee's
Federal statutory authority to abandon 8 ancf the state's traditional police power to protect public health and safety, 9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re
Quanta Resources Corp.,' ° recently held that a trustee's abandonment power does not preempt state and local laws regulating the
disposal of hazardous waste."
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta)' 2 was formerly in

N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0900 to -0923, 71-2702 (McKinney Supp. 1982);
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26-2.1(b) (Supp. 1984).
6 "Disposal" of hazardous waste is defined by New York environmental statute
as
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing
of any waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that
such waste or hazardous waste or any related constituent thereof may
enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters of the state including groundwaters thereof.
N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0901(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982); cf. N.J. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 7, § 26-1.4 (Supp. 1984) (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's definition of "disposal").
7 "Hazardous waste" is defined by New York environmental statute as "a waste
or combination of wastes which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical,
chemical or infectious characteristics may . . .[p]ose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, disposed, or otherwise managed." N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 27-0901(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982); cf. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 26-1.4 (Supp.
1984) (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's definition of "hazardous waste").
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982) (codification of trustee's abandonment power)
(current version as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. § 554(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1985)).
9 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929) (municipal ordinance regulating storage of petroleum products upheld as valid exercise of
state's police power); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) (municipal ordinance governing garbage disposal upheld as legitimate exercise of state's police
power to protect public health); California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction
Works, 199 U.S. 306, 318 (1905) (cogent summary of source of state's police power
to legislate in interest of public health and safety).
10 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (New York suit), cert. granted sub nom. Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 105 S. Ct. 1168 (1985); 739
F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984) (NewJersey suit), cert. grantedsub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 105 S.Ct. 1168 (1985). The Third Circuit
issued two companion opinions as a result of the Quanta litigation, both of which
are entitled In re Quanta. One involved New York's environmental legislation; the
other involved New Jersey's environmental legislation. In order to clarify which
opinion is being referred to in this Note, a reference to the appropriate jurisdiction
will be included in parentheticals after cites to either of the Quanta opinions.
I1 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 922 (New York); Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928-29 (New Jersey).
12 Quanta was "a wholly owned subsidiary of Quanta Holding Corporation,
which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Waste Recovery Inc., which is a wholly owned
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the waste oil recovery business.1 3 It stored and treated industrial
and automotive waste oil and sludge for resale. 4 It operated facilities at Long land City, New York 5 and Edgewater, New
Jersey.' 6 Business activities at the sites were regulated by state
environmental protection agencies. 7 The agencies prohibited
subsidiary of Warburg Paribas Becker, Inc." Brief of Appellant New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, app., at A41, In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739
F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 105 S. Ct. 1168 (1985) [hereinafter cited as NJDEP
Brief].
13 See Petition of Midlantic National Bank for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 3, Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, cert. granted sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 105 S. Ct. 1168 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Midlantic's Petition].
14 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928 (New Jersey).
15 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 913 (New York). The New York facility is located in
the center of New York City. See id. Quanta acquired the facility when it purchased
the "assets, facilities and operations of the Hudson Oil Refining Corporation."
Brief of Appellants at 4, In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. granted sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
105 S. Ct. 1168 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellants]. Mortgages on the
New York facility were held by the Equitable Life Assurance Society and the Portland Holding Co. Quanta, 739 F.2d at 914 n.3 (New York). At the time of the bankruptcy proceedings, the aggregate amount due on the mortgages exceeded
$428,000. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit at 4-51, O'Neill v. City of New York, cert. granted sub nom.
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 105 S. Ct. 1168
(1985) [hereinafter cited as O'Neill's Petition]. A judgment was entered by the
bankruptcy court establishing the validity of the mortgage liens in the amount of
$344,464. Id. app. G, at 53a. These liens were subsequently foresaken. Quanta, 739
F.2d at 914 n.3 (New York).
16 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928 (New Jersey). Quanta occupied the New Jersey
facility under an assignment of a lease by Edgewater Terminals, Inc. Midlantic's
Petition, supra note 13, at 3. The premises were owned by appellants,James Frohla
and Albert Von Dohlin. NJDEP Brief, supra note 12, at 3.
On June 3, 1981, Midlantic National Bank (Midlantic) loaned $600,000 to
Quanta for working capital. Midlantic's Petition, supra note 13, at 3. A judgment
was entered by the bankruptcy court on April 5, 1982, establishing a "first priority
secured interest" in Midlantic against Quanta's New Jersey inventory, equipment,
and accounts receivable. Id. at 3 n.1.
17 The New York facility was subject to an administrative consent order between
Quanta and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. See Brief
of Appellants, supra note 15, at 4-5. The consent order required that Quanta maintain and operate the facility in accordance with the state's environmental conservation laws. Id. at 5.
Quanta's New Jersey facility was previously operated by its assignor, Edgewater Terminals, Inc., as a special waste facility for storage, reprocessing, and reclamation of waste oil, oil emulsions, and sludge. See NJDEP Brief, supra note 12, at
A 1l.Similarly, the New Jersey facility was operated under an administrative consent order, whereby Quanta was required to operate the site in accordance with
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26-2.1(b) (Supp. 1984). NJDEP Brief, supra note 12, at
A14.
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Quanta from accepting polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)' 8
waste. 19

PCB contaminated waste was discovered, however, at both
facilities. 2 ° Quanta, because of the contamination, had exceeded
its operating authority and thus was in violation of state environmental protection laws. 2 ' While negotiations concerning its duty
to clean up the New Jersey site in compliance with state hazardous waste disposal laws were pending, Quanta filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the 1978 Act. 22 The Chapter 11 action was subsequently converted to a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7, and Thomas
J. O'Neill was appointed trustee for the debtor.23
O'Neill filed notices to abandon the facilities under section
554(a). 24 He claimed that the property was burdensome, inasmuch as the cost of cleaning up the PCB waste in accordance with
18 PCB's are toxic. PCB oxidation products, such as polychlorinated dibenz-podioxins (dioxins) and polychlorinated dibenzo forans, are also toxic. Quanta, 739
F.2d at 913 n.l (New York).
19 See id. at 913; Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928 (New Jersey).
20 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 913 (New York); Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928 (New Jersey).
Of the 500,000 gallons of waste oil and chemicals stored at the New York site,
70,000 gallons were contaminated with PCB's. Quanta, 739 F.2d at 913 (New
York).
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) discovered
PCB contamination at the New Jersey site on June 23, 1981. Quanta, 739 F.2d at
928 (New Jersey). When the facility was abandoned, there were approximately
800,000 gallons of mixed industrial and automotive waste oil that was contaminated with greater than 50 parts per million (ppm) of PCB's. See NJDEP Brief, supra
note 12, at A4.
21 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 913 n.2 (New York); Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928 (New
Jersey).
22 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928 (NewJersey). The NJDEP had submitted an administrative consent order to Quanta setting forth Quanta's responsibility to clean up
the New Jersey site. Quanta, however, did not sign the order. NJDEP Brief, supra
note 12, at A42. On October 6, 1981, Quanta filed a petition in bankruptcy. Quanta,
739 F.2d at 928 (New Jersey). On October 7, 1981, the NJDEP ordered Quanta to
cease all operations, clean up the facility, and close the site within one year. Id.
23 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 913 (New York); Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928 (New Jersey).
24 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 913 (New York). On March 18, 1982, the clerk of the
bankruptcy court issued a notice of "sale by public auction or abandonment" of the
New York facility. See O'Neill's Petition, supra note 15, at 5. No offers were received at the auction sale. Id. Subsequently, however, an offer to purchase the facility for $3000, subject to mortgages and liens, was approved by the court. Later, the
court voided the approved sale when it was determined that the offeror was unaware of the PCB contamination at the facility. Id. at 6.
On May 25, 1982, a second notice of abandonment was issued. Id. Following
hearings on June 8 and 22, 1982, the bankruptcy court authorized abandonment,
and a formal order of abandonment was entered onJuly 7, 1982, effectiveJune 22,
1982, nunc pro tunc. Id. at 6-7.
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state hazardous waste disposal laws would exhaust the debtor's
estate.2 5 New York and NewJersey objected to the trustee's abandonment of the contaminated sites, arguing that it would be tantamount to unlawful disposal of hazardous waste.2 6
Following hearings, the bankruptcy court permitted the
trustee to abandon the facilities,2 7 reasoning that "[t]he City and
State are in a better position in every respect than either the
Trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCB-contaminated facility."21 8 The debtor and its creditors, in the court's view,
were not financially responsible for the cleanup. 29 The court refused to stay its order pending appeal and also denied New
York's request for a first lien on the property on account of mon30
ies expended by the state to clean up the facility.
In affirming the order granting abandonment, the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey expressly
adopted the rationale espoused by the bankruptcy court.3 ' Judge
Lacey, author of the court's opinion, distinguished the common
law authority to abandon from the Federal statutory abandonment power. 3 2 Because the traditional rule with respect to abandonment was judge-made, the court reasoned that it had to
"yield to federal statutes and the general public interest. ' 33 In
Judge Lacey's view, the absence of any clear congressional intent
to limit the trustee's Federal statutory power to abandon demonstrated that section 554(a) was not contingent "upon a finding
that abondonment [sic] does not harm the public interest or vio25 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 913-14 (New York). The New York facility had an
appraised fair market value of $535,000 and a forced sale value of $428,000.
O'Neill's Petition, supra note 15, at 4-5. It was also estimated that the cost to clean
up the facility would exceed $1,000,000. Id. at 5. In addition, after the discovery of
the PCB contamination, the trustee was required to maintain 24 hour surveillance
at the site at a cost greater than $1000 weekly. Id. O'Neill also personally borrowed
$20,000-most of which was allocated for security. Id. The record does not reveal
the status of the trustee's loan, i.e., whether it was recoverable as an administrative
expense of the debtor's estate.
26 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 914 (New York); Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928 (New Jersey).
27 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 914 (New York); Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928 (NewJersey).
28 O'Neill's Petition, supra note 15, app. K, at 73a (transcript of bankruptcy proceedings on June 22, 1982).
29 Id.
30 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 914 (New York). After abandonment, New York incurred
approximately $2,500,000 in cleanup costs. Id.
31 See O'Neill's Petition, supra note 15, app. G, at 57a (memo. opinion ofJudge
Frederick B. Lacey, D.N.J. Jan. 1983).
32 See id. at 56a.
33

Id.
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late any statutes." 3 4 The Third Circuit subsequently reversed the
order permitting abandonment and remanded.3 5 Before any action was taken by the lower court, however, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.3 6
Prior to the enactment of section 554(a) of the 1978 Act, the
trustee had no statutory authority to disclaim title to burdensome
property of the debtor's estate.3 7 Nevertheless, courts developed
a judge-made rule of abandonment predicated in part upon the
trustee's comprehensive authority to marshall the debtor's assets
for liquidation and distribution to creditors.3
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in American File Co. v. Garrett,39 recognized the trustee's
right to abandon burdensome property of the debtor's estate.40
In that case, the Court allowed the shareholders' assignees to dis34 Id. at 57a.
35 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 914 (New York); Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928 (NewJersey).
36 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 105 S. Ct. 1168
(1985).
37 See 4A COLLIER, supra note 2,
70.42[2], at 502.
38 See id. at 502-04 & n.4; see also 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1982); cf. Quanta, 739 F.2d at
916 (New York) (mentioning trustee's statutory power to reject executory contracts, applications involving intellectual property, and real property encumbered
with taxes). Section 704 enumerates the duties of the trustee as follows:
The trustee shall(1) collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for
which such trustee serves, and close up such estate as expeditiously as is
compatible with the best interests of parties in interest;
(2) be accountable for all property received;
(3) investigate the financial affairs of the debtor;
(4) if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper;
(5) if advisable, oppose the discharge of the debtor;
(6) unless the court orders otherwise, furnish such information
concerning the estate and the estate's administration as is requested by
a party in interest;
(7) if the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated, file
with the court and with any governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection or determination of any tax arising out of such operation, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business,
including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the court requires; and
(8) make a final report and file a final account of the administration
of the estate with the court.
11 U.S.C. § 704 (1982).
39 110 U.S. 288 (1884).
40 Id. at 295. See generally Note, Rights of a Trustee of Bankrupt Estate to Abandon
Burdensome Assets in Contravention of Federal Navigation Acts, 13 MD. L. REv. 229, 232
(1953) (discussion of history of trustee's common law right to abandon burdensome property of bankrupt's estate). Ten years prior to American File, the Supreme
Court of the United States acknowledged in dicta the trustee's common law right to
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claim title to the bankrupt's stock, which was burdened with personal liability for corporate indebtedness. 4 ' Observing that a
shareholder's individual liability did not generally attach to the
assignees of his shares,4 2 the Court reasoned that "[t]he same
result would follow under [bankruptcy] law." 4 3 Relying upon
early English bankruptcy cases, the Court determined that "[i]t
has long been a recognized principle of the bankrupt laws that
to accept property of an onerous
the assignees [are] not bound
44
or unprofitable character."

This well-established common law right to abandon burdensome property, however, was not absolute. 45 The bankruptcy
courts, in the exercise of their equitable powers, occasionally disallowed the trustee's disclaimer.4 6 Specifically, the judge-made
rule of abandonment was held to be inapplicable when it conflicted with "general regulations of a police nature."4 7
In the 1942 decision of In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co. ,48 the
Seventh Circuit, utilizing the police power exception permitted
abandon property of an "onerous or unprofitable character." Glenny v. Langdon,
98 U.S. 20, 31 (1878).
41 American File, 110 U.S. at 294-95. Because the American File Company had
not filed certain documents with the town clerk, its stockholders were individually
liable under state statute for the company's debts, as evidenced by promissory
notes guaranteed by them. Id. at 288-89.
42 Id. at 295.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 E.g., Brown v.

O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598 (1937) (judicial review of trustee's
abandonment of bankrupt's stock burdened with personal shareholder liability); see
70.42[2], at 502-04; see also Note, supra note 40, at 232
4A COLLIER, supra note 2,
(describing trustee's common law abandonment power as "discretionary").
46 See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'l. Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1933)
(disallowing abandonment when it would infringe upon creditors' rights). See generally Note, Abandonment of Worthless Barges by Trustee Disapproved Because Violation of
Federal Navigation Statute Would Result, 66 HARV. L. REV. 921, 922 (1953) (briefly
discussing disallowance of abandonment in limited circumstances).
47 4A COLLIER, supra note 2,
70.42[2], at 504.
48 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942). In Chicago Rapid Transit,
the trustees of a public utility corporation petitioned the district court for permission to reject the lease of a railroad branch line, and if necessary to prevent the
termination of transportation service on the leased line, to authorize them to operate the service for the lessor's account. Id. at 3-4. The request for abandonment
was predicated upon the losses incurred on the leasehold. Specifically, when the
lessee filed for reorganization, it was in substantial rental arrears. Similarly, the
receivers were subsequently unable to fulfill the financial obligations under the
lease. Id. Finding that the lease was burdensome, the district court permitted its
abandonment. Id. at 4. In addition, the district court directed the trustees to maintain transportation service on the branch line for the benefit of the lessor pending
authorization to the contrary by the state's public utility commission. Id. The order
of the district court was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 6.
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the trustees of a public utility corporation to abandon a burdensome lease of a railroad branch line. 49 The court also directed
them, however, to maintain transportation service on the line for
the lessor's benefit, pending contrary authorization by the state's
public utility commission.50
The Seventh Circuit majority focused upon the distinction
between disclaiming the lease and abandoning transportation
service on the lease.5 ' After examining the scope of Federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy vis-a-vis the state's traditional power to
regulate local transportation, 5 2 the court found that the lease was
burdensome property subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, 53 whereas the transportation service was a public
utility regulated by state statute. 54 The majority reasoned that in
the absence of explicit congressional intent to supersede the
state's regulation of local transportation, 5 5 the bankruptcy court
lacked jurisdiction to authorize the trustees' abandonment of the
state's public service.5 6 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, held that
the trustees "[had to] comply with valid statutory regulation by
57
the state."
In 1952, the Fourth Circuit in Ottenheimer v. Whitaker5 8 broadened the scope of the common law police power exception to
include the Federal police power. The court in Ottenheimer disallowed the trustee's abandonment of burdensome barges that
were anchored in Baltimore Harbor5 9 and, in addition, directed

51

Id. at 3-5.
Id. at 5-6.
Id.

52

Id.

53

56

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.

57

Id.

49
50

54

55

198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952).
Id. at 290. The application to abandon was premised upon the trustee's inability to sell the barges and the expenses incurred by the estate in keeping them
afloat and lighted as required by the Federal Wreck Act. In re Eastern Transp. Co.,
102 F. Supp. 913, 914 (D. Md.), affj'd sub nom. Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d
289 (4th Cir. 1952). In addition, the trustee claimed that the high costs of removing the barges from the bay and sinking them at sea would diminish the value of the
debtor's estate. Therefore, the trustee argued that under the common law rule of
abandonment, he should be permitted to disclaim the barges as burdensome property of the debtor's estate. The bankruptcy referee entered an order granting abandonment, and the Federal government appealed. Id.
The government's opposition to abandonment was based upon the grounds
that it would constitute a violation of Federal law, because if abandonment were
allowed, the barges would sink in the harbor and thereby impede the navigability of
58

59
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him to remove the barges from the harbor at the expense of the
debtor's estate.60 Judge Soper, speaking for a unanimous court,
found that abandonment of the barges would have constituted a
violation of a Federal statute that was enacted in the interest of
public safety. 6 ' Determining that the Federal interest in public
safety was paramount, the Fourth Circuit held that a Federal statute of a police nature preempted a trustee's common law right to
abandon.62
Subsequently, in 1978, the bankruptcy court in In re Lewis
Jones63 applied the police power exception to the common law
rule of abandonment despite the nonexistence of a competing
Federal or state statute safeguarding the public welfare. 4 The
Lewis Jones court conditioned the abandonment of a steam heating system, which served the Greater Philadelphia area, upon the
trustees first taking affirmative steps, at the expense of the estates, to protect the public from potential danger.65 In reaching
its decision, the court reasoned that "even absent the violation of
a state or federal act, the public interest must be protected by the
Bankruptcy Court."' 66 In support of its rationale, the Lewis Jones
court relied upon both the public interest consideration underlying railroad reorganizations and the equitable power vested in
the bankruptcy courts.6 7
In 1984, the Third Circuit, in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of

Environmental Resources,68 defined the scope of the statutory police
power exception to the automatic stay provision of section 362 of
the 1978 Act. The Penn Terra court first observed that the exception applied to the " 'commencement or continuation of an acwaters of the United States. The government also posited that the common rule of
abandonment was discretionary and, therefore, should not be applied when it
would operate in contravention of Federal law. Id. at 916-17. Finding that the Federal Wreck Act would be violated if the trustee was permitted to disclaim the
barges, id. at 915-18, and dismissing as immaterial the lack of funds available to
satisfy the statutory obligation, the district court rescinded the abandonment order
and directed the trustee to remove the barges at the expense of the bankrupt's
estate. Id. at 918, The Fourth Circuit subsequently affirmed the decision of the
district court. Ottenheimer, 198 F.2d at 290.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See id.
63 1 Bankr. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974).
64 Id. at 279-80.
65 Id. at 280.
66 Id. (citing In re Eastern Transp., 102 F. Supp. 913 (E. Md.), aff'd sub nom. Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952)).
67 Id.
68 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
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tion or proceeding by [the government] to enforce [its] police
• . .power.' "69 The court further noted, however, that by virtue
of the money judgment exception to the police power exception,
actions for money judgments or their enforcement were subject
to automatic stay. 70 Judge Garth, writing for the court, concentrated on delineating the parameters of the money judgment exception. On the basis of general principles of statutory
construction, he determined that the money judgment exception
should be construed narrowly, while the police power exception
should be interpreted broadly.7 ' In the court's view, the "inquiry
is . . . properly focused on the nature of the injuries which the
• . . remedy is intended to redress-including whether plaintiff
seeks compensation for past damages . . .in order to reach the
ultimate conclusion as to whether these injuries are traditionally
rectified by a money judgment and its enforcement. "72
The Penn Terra court then observed that Pennsylvania's suit
against a debtor for injunctive relief to remedy environmental
hazards, which existed in violation of the state's antipollution
statutes, was neither an action for a money judgment nor enforcement of a money judgment. 73 Finding that the issued injunction "was meant to prevent future harm to, and to restore,
the environment," Judge Garth reasoned that the suit was intended to enforce the state's police power and thus did not fall
within the money judgment exception to the police power exception.7 ' Hence, the Third Circuit held that an injunction that required a debtor to comply with state environmental protection
legislation was excluded from the automatic stay provision in section 362 by virtue of the police power exception.7 5
Three months following his delivery of the unanimous decision in Penn Terra, Judge Garth authored the majority opinion in
Quanta. In rejecting the trustee's argument that Federal law is
not limited by state law, the Quanta court relied primarily upon
id. at 271 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982)).
See id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982)).
71 Id. at 272-73.
72 Id. at 278.
73 Id. at 274-78.
74 Id. at 278.
75 Id. at 278-79; cf.Note, When Is a Governmental Unit's Action to Enforce Its Police or
Regulatory Power Exemptfrom the Automatic Stay Provisions of Section 362, 9 FLA. Sr. U. L.
REV. 369 (1981) (advocating court's cognizance of purpose underlying governmental action in determining scope of statutory police power exception set forth in
section 362(b)(4) of Title 11 of the 1978 Act).
69
70
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the supremacy clause.7 6
Judge Garth began his analysis from the perspective that
Federal preemption is not preferred " 'in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has
unmistakably so ordained.'
Thus, he maintained that a proper
analysis initially proceeds in two steps: "first, an examination of
the primary purposes of each of the laws at issue; [and] second, a
determination of whether state
law is an obstacle to the effectua78
tion of federal objectives.
According to the Quanta court, the general goal of Federal
bankruptcy legislation is to resolve justly the creditors' claims
against the debtor. 79 The specific aim of liquidation, the court
noted, is to distribute equitably the debtor's assets among creditors.80 The means of accomplishing this twofold purpose, according to the Third Circuit, lies in the trustee's statutory
abandonment authority. 8 ' Because abandonment empowers the
trustee to disclaim burdensome property, the court reasoned that
it accelerates administration of the estate and thwarts depletion
of the debtor's assets. 8 2 Hence, in Judge Garth's view, abandonment promotes the creditors' interests.8 "
The Quanta court next observed that the quintessential purpose of state and local hazardous waste disposal regulation is to
protect the public from toxic exposure.8 4 After concluding that
the concurrent exercise of state and Federal power would result
in irreconcilable conflict, 85 the majority moved on to the third
phase of its supremacy clause analysis-whether "Congress in",77

See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 915 (New York). The supremacy clause provides that
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
77 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 915 (New York) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); citing Consolidated Edison v. Montana,
453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981)).
78 Id. at 915.
76

79 Id.

80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See id.
85 Id.
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tend[ed] that the trustee's abandonment power be unrestricted
by public health and safety regulations. "86
After succinctly reiterating its preemption standard, 7 the
Quanta court noted that section 554(a) of the 1978 Act is devoid
of legislative history. 88 It also observed that prior to the enactment of the 1978 Act, Federal statutory authority to abandon
burdensome property was nonexistent, although common law
abandonment was prevalent.8 " The Third Circuit then concluded
that "Section 554 obviously codifies this judge-made law." 90 Proceeding from that premise, Judge Garth examined existing common law precedent. 9 '
The Quanta court commenced its survey of prior law with Ottenheimer.92 It focused on the Ottenheimer court's balancing of the
trustee's and government's competing interests.9 3 Assaying Ottenheimer, the Quanta majority construed it to mean "that the determinations of the legislature and the policy of safeguarding the
public [as embodied in the Federal statute] were paramount"
when juxtaposed to the trustee's common law power to
abandon.4
In next discussing Lewis Jones,"5 the court observed that while
the holding therein was premised in part upon the rationale of
Ottenheimer, it was grounded principally in the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. 9 6 Likewise, the decision in Chicago
Rapid Transit, 7 in Judge Garth's view, resulted from the bankruptcy court's exercise of its equitable powers. 8 Judge Garth also
asserted, however, that the result in Chicago Rapid Transit was
based upon the supremacy clause.99 The absence of any express
congressional intent to withdraw from the state its traditional
power to regulate local transportation, according to the Quanta
Id.
Id. at 916 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) and Penn
Terra, 733 F.2d at 272)).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See id. at 916-18.
92 See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ottenheimer.
93 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 916 (New York).
94 Id.
95 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lewis Jones.
96 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 917 (New York).
97 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chicago Rapid
Transit.
98 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 917 (New York).
99 See id.
86
87
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majority, dissuaded the bankruptcy court in Chicago Rapid Transit
from authorizing abandonment and interfering with the state's
railroad service.' 0 0
The Quanta court concluded its review of the prior law with
In re Adelphi Hospital Corp. ,' wherein the trustee was allowed to
abandon medical records despite countervailing state law. After
quoting at length from that opinion, Judge Garth distinguished
the state statute in Adelphi Hospital on the basis of its tenuous
0 2
nexus with public safety.'
Finally, in synthesizing its exposition of existing precedent,
the Quanta majority extrapolated "[a] common concern. . .in all
four. . . cases: that where important state law or general equitable principles protect some public interest, they should not be
overridden by federal legislation unless they are inconsistent
with explicit congressional intent such that the supremacy clause
10 3
mandates their supersession by the abandonment power."'
Concluding that the mere existence of conflicting state law is insufficient to invoke Federal preemption,' °4 the court found it
necessary to analyze several other provisions of the 1978 Act to
determine whether any of those sections expressly supplants
05
state law.1
That the 1978 Act does not preempt state and local environmental protection laws, according to the Quanta court, is evidenced by the recently adopted abandonment provision. 0 6
Section 554, in the majority's view, speaks solely in the affirmative, and hence is bereft of any express negation of state powers. 10 7 Moreover, according to the Third Circuit, 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(4) is similarly persuasive because it explicitly excepts a
state's suit to enforce its environmental protection laws from being stayed by virtue of the initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings.10 8
In addition, the Quanta court maintained that 28 U.S.C.
100 See id.

101 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
Cir. June 26, 1978).
102 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 918 (New York).

66,882, at 76,855 (2d

103 Id.
104 Id.

See id. at 918-21.
See id.at 918; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing abandonment provision).
107 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 918 (New York).
108 Id. at 918-19; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), (5) (1982). The statute sets forth,
in pertinent part:
105
106
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§ 959(b) lends further support to the proposition that the 1978
Act does not preempt state and local environmental legislation.10 9 Section 959(b), the court observed, requires that a
trustee "manage and operate [the debtor's estate] . . . according
to the requirements of the valid laws of the State."" Inherent in
that section, according to the court, is the concept that the objectives of the Federal bankruptcy scheme do not condone contravention of state laws concerning business conduct and
activities. ''
Finding no legislative history from which to glean the meaning of "manage and operate," the majority opined that it would
not be unreasonable to construe the phrase as encompassing
abandonment of a facility. 1 2 According to the court, the distinction between operating a business and abandoning a facility
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance
or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under thi- title, or to
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
the estate, of ajudgment obtained before the commencement of the
case under this title; . . .
(b)The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
• . .does not operate as a stay-.
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement
or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to
enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section of the enforcement of a
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power.
Id.

109 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 919 (New York). 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1972) states:

[E]xcept as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United
States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the
property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof
would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
Id.
110 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 919 (New York).
I'I Id.
112 Id.
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should not be unequivocally employed so as to preclude abandonment from within the purview of section 959(b)." 3 Such an
court's view, would vitiate the sigunyielding distinction, in the
14
nificance of the provision."
To support its interpretation of section 959(b), the Quanta
court examined and compared the interests sought to be protected in Chapter 7 liquidation and Chapter 11 reorganization
proceedings, respectively. 1 5 The court observed that creditors'
interests are the same in Chapter 7 as in Chapter 11.116 The court
further found that reorganization proceedings also implicate the
debtor's interest in rehabilitation.' 17 Nevertheless, section
959(b), according to the Third Circuit, is applicable in Chapter
11 to defeat both the creditors' and debtor's interests."i8 Judge
Garth thus concluded that Section 959(b) should not be inapposite to Chapter 7 solely because the creditors' interests may be
impaired." 9 Concluding that Section 959(b) does not demonstrate that the Legislature has " 'unmistakably ordained' that
state law is superseded by the trustee's powers to administer the
property of the estate,"' 120 the Quanta court then examined 11
U.S.C. § 105 and 28 U.S.C. § 1481.121
Judge Garth observed that both of these provisions incorpo22
rate general equitable principles into the bankruptcy scheme.'
Section 105, according to the majority, specifically empowers
bankruptcy courts to "issue any order, process, or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions"' 123 of the
1978 Act; while Section 1481 expressly vests them with equitable
jurisdiction. 124 After considering both the absence of express legislative intent to supersede state and local environmental protection laws and the clear congressional intent to the contrary, the
Quanta court concluded that "federal law is supreme only if those
113 Id. at 920. The court noted, however, that the difference between operating a
business and abandoning a facility is valid in the context of Federal preemption of
inconsistent state laws establishing creditors' rights. Id. (citing American Surety
Co. v. Sampsell, 327 U.S. 269, 272 (1946)).
'14 Id.
115 See id.

116 See id.
'17

Id.

118 Id.
19 Id.
120

Id.

121
122
123
124

See
Id.
Id.
Id.

id. at 920-21.
at 920.
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982)).
(28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982)).
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[equitable] principles demand that state police powers be suspended to the extent they interfere with the liquidation of the
estate." 125
The Third Circuit next identified and balanced the competing state and Federal policies to determine whether equity dictated the suspension of the state and local hazardous waste
disposal laws.'1 6 In the court's view, environmental protection
laws "advance a very important policy: [protection of] the public
health by regulating disposal of toxic wastes."' 12 7 According to
Judge Garth, the trustee's abandonment not only would violate
those laws but, in addition, would present "severely deleterious
implications for the public safety."' 2 8 These circumstances, in
Judge Garth's
view, made Quanta analogous to Ottenheimer and
29
Lewis Jones. 1

Conversely, the purpose underlying abandonment, Judge
Garth explained, is "to preserve as much of the estate as possible
for distribution to creditors."'' 30 According to the majority, however, the abandonment policy also must take into account the attendant Federal policy of noninterference with state police
powers. 13' While acknowledging that statutory compliance would
absorb assets otherwise available to satisfy creditors' claims, the
Quanta court nevertheless held that this financial consideration
was "not in itself sufficient to outweigh the public interest at
stake."' 13 2 In the court's opinion, greater significance should be
afforded to heightened public awareness of dangerous toxic
waste, the unprecedented possibility of abandoned nuclear
power plants, and the fear of "substitut[ing] . . . governmental

action for citizen compliance" with statutory cleanup provisions. 133 Concluding its constitutional analysis, the Third Circuit
held that "[t]he supremacy clause does not require the suspen1 4
sion of the operation of. . .hazardous waste disposal laws."'
Finally, in addressing whether the state's cleanup costs are
recoverable as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C.
§§ 503(b) and 507(a), the Quanta court determined that the cate125

Id. at 921.

126

See id. at 921-22.

127

Id. at 921.

128
129
130
131

Id.

132

Id.

133
134

See id. at 921-22.
Id. at 922.

Id.
Id.
See id.
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gories enumerated in those provisions are merely illustrative, not
exhaustive. 135 In the majority's view, cleanup costs appear to fall
within the scope of "actual, necessary costs of preserving the estate."1 36 judge Garth asserted, however, that because the priority
of the state's cleanup claim had not been addressed by the lower
13 7
court, the issue was not properly before the Third Circuit.
In a vehement dissent, Judge Gibbons rejected the majority's
supremacy clause analysis and concluded that the trustee should
be permitted to abandon the Quanta facilities.' 8 In his view, the
majority's reliance on Ottenheimer and Lewis Jones was misplaced,
because those cases had been decided before trustees were
vested with statutory abandonment power. 139 Moreover, to the
dissent, the absence of any stated exception to section 554(a)
demonstrated that Congress had not intended to limit a trustee's
exercise of the statutory abandonment power. 140 The dissent also
criticized the court's exposition of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), explaining
as imposing an obligation to operate
that it "cannot be construed
' 41
any business or property."1

In conclusion, Judge Gibbons viewed the majority's decision
as implicitly assessing cleanup costs against the trustee, debtor,
and creditors in violation of the taking clause of the fifth amendment.' 4 2 In his opinion, the majority's interpretation of section
554(a) deviated from the rule that requires a court to avoid,
135 See id. at 922. 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1982) states, in pertinent part:

(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed, administrative expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(0 of this title, including(1)(A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services
rendered after the commencement of the case.
Id. § 503(b)(1)(A).
11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982) states, in pertinent part:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(1) First, administrative expenses allowed under section
503(b) of this title, and any fees and charges assessed against the
estate under chapter 123 of title 28.
Id. § 507(a)(1).
136 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 922-23 (New York); see also supra note 135 (text of statutory provision).
137 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 923 (New York). The court noted that the record on appeal did not contain "findings of relevant fact" on the issue of priority. Id.
138 Id.; Quanta, 739 F.2d 929 (New Jersey) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
139 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 923-24 (New York) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
140 See id. at 924 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 926 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
142 See id. at 924-26 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The taking clause provides: "Nor
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whenever possible, constitutional issues when construing a statute. 1 4 3 According to the dissent, if the court had followed this
principle of statutory construction, the taking issues would have
144
been averted, and abandonment would have been authorized.
Instead, in Judge Gibbons's view, the majority reached a result,
45
that is neither legally permissible nor practicably tenable.
In holding that state and local hazardous waste disposal laws
are not preempted by section 554(a) of the 1978 Act, 14 6 the
Quanta court superimposed the judicially-created police power
exception to common law abandonment on the trustee's recently
codified Federal power to disclaim burdensome property of the
debtor's estate. After noting the absence of legislative history of
the provision, 14 7 the Third Circuit, on the basis of its supremacy
clause analysis, divined that the statutory abandonment power in
bankruptcy is not pervasive-just as the trustee's authority at
common law was not absolute. 148 The court, in essence, conditioned the trustee's exercise of the Federal statutory power to
abandon toxic waste sites upon compliance with cleanup provisions of state and local environmental protection laws. However
preferable this outcome may be, the Third Circuit's decision, unfortunately, is not sound because the majorty manipulated its
supremacy clause analysis in order to achieve the desired result.
Although artfully drafted, the court's application of the preemption doctrine was improper. 149 The majority has gone to
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
CONST.,

U.S.

amend. V, cl. 4.

143 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 924-25 (New York) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (discussing
United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982)).
144 Id. at 925 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
145 See id. at 924-27 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 922 (New York); Quanta, 739 F.2d at 928-29 (New Jersey).
147 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 916 (New York); see also Klee, supra note 1, at 294-95 (setting forth nine step procedure to search legislative history for ascertaining congressional intent in interpreting the 1978 Act).
148 See supra notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text.
149 The doctrine of Federal preemption does not depend entirely upon the
supremacy clause. Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DE
PAUL L. REV. 630, 634-35 (1972). Rather, "the preemption of conflicting state and
local action . . .flow[s] directly from the substantive source of the congressional

action coupled with the supremacy clause." L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw § 6-23, at 376 (1st ed. 1978) (emphasis supplied). Just as the essence of congressional power to preempt emanates from various sources, reinforced by the
supremacy clause, the manner in which this authority is exercised also takes numerous forms, including occupation of the field, literal impossibility, state frustration of
the Federal scheme, actual conflict, and expressed and implied preemption. See
generally id. at 376-86 (discussing various forms). Although case law has blurred the
distinctions among the sources of Federal authority to preempt, the decisions have
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great length to disguise its gloss-over of the threshold inquiry"whether application of the state law frustrates the full effectuation of the objectives of federal bankruptcy legislation."' 5 ° Had
nevertheless contributed to the development of the preemption concept by "identifqying] federal-state conflict as being of several kinds with different attitudes being
shown by the Court as to each." Id.
Federal authority to legislate in the area of bankruptcy is derived explicitly
from the Federal Constitution, which states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he Congress
shall have Power.

.

. to establish

. . .

uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies

throughout the United states." U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8. There is no comparable
enumerated power conferred upon Congress in the field of environmental protection. On the contrary, that area traditionally has been reserved for regulation by
the states. For a proper understanding of the preemption issue here involved, it is
essential to recognize that: (1) Federal potency to preempt state and local hazardous waste disposal laws lies in article I, section 8 of the Constitution and consequently is licensed by the supremacy clause; (2) the 1978 Act, like the earlier acts,
occupies the field of bankruptcy, except insofar as state law may establish creditors'
rights, Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979); (3) the respective Federal
and state legislatures are not legislating on the same subject matter-Congress is
addressing bankruptcy whereas the state houses are considering environmental
protection; and (4) neither the 1978 Act in general, nor section 554(a) in particular,
expressly preempts state and local hazardous waste disposal laws. But see infra note
156 (sections 362(b)(4) expressly excepting enforcement of police powers from
within scope of automatic stay). Thus, the issue in Quanta is more accurately
couched in terms of implied preemption due to an actual conflict between Federal
and state objectives.
150 Quanta, 739 F.2d at 915 (New York) (citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,
652 (1971)). In Perez, the Court addressed the question of whether a provision in
the Bankrputcy Act, which fully discharges the debtor from particular judgments,
preempted an Arizona motor vehicle financial responsibility statute. Perez, 402 U.S.
at 638. The state statute provided that " '[a] discharge in bankruptcy following the
rendering of any . . . judgment [entered pursuant hereto] shall not relieve the
judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this article.' " Id. at 642. According to the Perez court, "[d]eciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal
statute and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining
the constitutional question whether they are in conflict." Id. at 644.
Justice White, writing for the majority, found that the main objective of the
state statute was " 'the protection of the public using the highways from financial
hardship which may result from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible
persons.' " Id. at 644 (quoting Schecter v. Killingswort, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136
(1963)). By contrast, the Court reiterated that " '[o]ne of the primary purposes of
the bankruptcy act' is to give debtors 'a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt.'" Id. at 648 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 N.E. 234, 244 (1934)).
Thereafter, the Court traced the Federal doctrine of preemption from the seminal case of Gibbons v. Odgen, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) to the twentieth century case of
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). The majority
rejected as "aberrational" a preemption test emanating from two bankruptcy cases
previously decided by the Court. Id. at 650-52 (citing Kester v. Department of Pub.
Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962) and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941)). Asserting that
those cases turned on the articulated purposes of the state statutes instead of their
actual effect, the Perez court held that they had "no authoritative effect to the extent

986

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:967

the majority squarely applied this standard, it would have been
apparent to the court at the outset that the state's exercise of its
statutory cleanup provisions completely negatived any possibility
of paying creditors' valid claims. Instead, the court purported to
glean justification for its decision from incongruous sections of
the 1978 Act.
In an overt effort to compensate for this oversight, the Third
Circuit turned to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).' 5 ' The court's reliance
upon an express police power exception in a separate and distinct provision, however, does not support its salutary cause. A
generally accepted rule of statutory construction provides that an
express exception to one provision should not be interpolated
into another section absent clear legislative intent to that
52
effect. 1
The majority's exposition of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) also extended beyond legally permissible boundaries. The scope of that
section's applicability was not at issue in the case. Nonetheless,
the Quanta court derivatively determined that section 959(b) applies to liquidation proceedings under Chapter 7.151
Finally, the Third Circuit disregarded both the financial
ramifications and the constitutional implications of its decithat they are inconsistent with the controlling principle that any state legislation
which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the
Supremacy Clause." Id. at 652. Finding that the Arizona statute had the effect, as
well as purpose, of frustrating the Federal bankruptcy law, the Court concluded
that the state statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 686.
Although the Quanta majority purported to follow Perez, it clearly deviated from
that decision. Conspicuously absent in Perez is any weighing of the competing Federal and state purposes. In fact, the Perez court expressly overruled earlier decisions upholding state statutes as against the Federal bankruptcy scheme because of
their reliance upon the purposes underlying the state legislation. See id. at 650-52;
see also Quanta, 739 F.2d at 924 (New York) (Gibbons,J., dissenting) (citing Railroad
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 101, 122-36 (1974) for proposition that balancing of competing interests is inappropriate).
151 See supra notes 107 & 108 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 25 B.R. 876, 878 (D. Minn. 1982) ("Generally, when an exception to a statute appears in a different section or subdivision
from the section containing the enacting words, the party claiming the benefit of
the exception has the burden of proving that he qualifies for the exception."); Denis v. Perfect Parts, 142 F. Supp. 259, 262 (D. Mass. 1956) ("no doctrine of general
construction [exists] that requires an unexpressed exception to be read into one
section merely to broaden the meaning of another"); see also Quanta, 739 F.2d at
924 (New York) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (comparing express police power exception to automatic stay provision and absence of comparable exception to abandonment provision). See generally SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.11 (N. Singer 4th ed. 1984 & 1985 Cum. Supp.) (exception only restricts
clause immediately preceding it).
153 See supra notes 115-19 & 141 and accompanying text.
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sion. 15 4 While mandating compliance with state hazardous waste
disposal laws, the court did not clearly identify the parties who
were to be charged with effectuating and financing the statutory
cleanup.1 5 5 Although the Quanta court emphatically denied that
cleanup costs were at issue, 1 56 its suggestion that funds, which
already had been expended by New York toward that end, might
qualify as reimbursable administrative expenses of the debtor's
estate, belies that assertion.' 5 7 In any event, the court's cursory
observation is of no moment in resolving the concomitant issue
of cleanup costs. The majority did not account for either the
substantial interests of third parties 58 or the apparent disparity
between exorbitant cleanup expenses and existing funds.
Moreover, the precedential import of the Third Circuit's decision must be evaluated in light of the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Ohio v. Kovacs.' 5 9 In that case, the state of Ohio
had obtained an injunction against Kovacs, both individually and
in his capacity as an officer of a corporation, which was engaged
in hazardous waste disposal, compelling him to clean up a haz1 60
ardous waste site in accordance with its antipollution statutes.
When Kovacs failed to comply with the order, a court-appointed
receiver intervened. 16 1 Subsequently, while the receiver was effectuating the required clean up, Kovacs filed a personal bankruptcy petition.' 6 2 The Supreme Court, affirming the decisions
below, found that the injunction, notwithstanding its affirmative
mandate to dispose of the hazardous waste, actually imposed
upon the debtor a financial obligation to pay the costs of
cleanup. 6 ' After concluding that Kovacs's duty constituted a
"debt" or "liability" on a claim within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.
§ 101,Justice White, writing for a unanimous court, determined
64
that it was dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Although Justice White subsequently stated that the Kovacs
Court was not adjudicating the issue of whether a trustee may
abandon a hazardous toxic waste site notwithstanding competing
See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
See Quanta 739 F.2d at 929 (New Jersey).
157 See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 922-23 (New York).
158 See id. at 925, n.2-3 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
159 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985).
160 Id. at 707.
154
155
156

161

Id.

162
163
164

Id.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 709-10.
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state environmental protection legislation, 165 he nonetheless revealed, in dicta, the analytical approach that the Supreme Court
most likely will adopt when confronted with the question in
Quanta.166 Justice White envisioned that
the trustee would. . .determine whether it [the hazardous
waste site] was of value to the estate. If the property was
worth more than the costs of bringing it into compliance with
state law, the trustee would undoubtedly sell it for its net
value, and the buyer would clean up the property, in which
event whatever obligation Kovacs might have had to clean up
the property would have been satisfied. If the property were
worth less than the cost of cleanup, the trustee would likely
abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with
16 7
the state environmental law to the extent of. . .its ability.
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in Kovacs, suggested that because state law generally establishes property rights in
the debtor's estate, 68 "a State may protect its interest in the enforcement of its environmental laws by giving cleanup judgments
' 69
the status of statutory liens or secured claims."'
It is apparent from these excerpts that the Supreme Court does
not foresee state environmental protection laws as constituting an
obstacle to the trustee's abandonment of a hazardous toxic waste
site. In Kovacs, the Court invoked neither the supremacy clause nor
the taking clause; rather, it simply assumed that the trustee was free
to abandon the debtor's property. It thus can be inferred from Kovacs that, in the Supreme Court's view, the trustee's Federal statutory power to abandon is not limited by state and local hazardous
waste disposal laws; hence, section 554(a) does not codify the police
power exception to the common law rule of abandonment. This inference casts further doubt on the Third Circuit's decision in Quanta
and lends additional support to Judge Gibbons's rationale.
The majority and dissent in Quanta reached opposite conclusions primarily because Judge Gibbons shared neither his colleagues' assumption concerning the codification of common law
abandonment nor their zeal to effectuate a particular result. Hence,
the dissent, on the basis of the Federal statute itself, determined that
the trustee could abandon the facilities despite the fact that they
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were laden with hazardous, toxic waste. 170 Unfortunately, principled
supremacy clause analysis yields no other result. It thus appears
that the Supreme Court, absent intervening Federal legislation, will
be constrained to reverse the Third Circuit's decision in Quanta and
to adopt Justice Gibbons's rationale. In addition, if the Court addresses cleanup costs, it may seize upon Justice O'Connor's purported solution to the disposal dilemma, enunciated in her
concurrence in Kovacs, by granting the state a statutory lien against
the Quanta estate on account of expenses incurred in enforcing its
environmental protection laws.
Congressional action should be taken, however, to prevent the
abandonment of hazardous toxic waste sites and to avert this type of
tragic legal consequence in the future. Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the Quanta majority's supremacy clause analysis, Judge
Garth's cognizance of public safety, and the value he assigns to it,'71
should not be underestimated. The breadth of the dangers posed
by hazardous toxic waste are potentially enormous. Moreover, the
rising incidents of toxic contamination, together with the likelihood
of abandoned nuclear power plants have intensified public anxiety. 172 Under these circumstances, public safety should be foremost.
Now is the time, pending imminent public disaster, for Congress to
treat the liquidation of toxic hazardous waste sites as a matter sui
generis.17 3 The corporate generator of hazardous toxic waste should
not be permitted to escape financial responsibility through bankruptcy at the expense of public health and safety.
Catherine A. Kiernan
See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 923 (New York) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
See id. at 922.
172 See id. at 921.
173 That Federal legislation in bankruptcy may take into consideration the general public interest is demonstrated by the railroad reorganization statute contained in the 1978 Act. See 11 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982). Section 1165 states, in
pertinent part, that "the court and the trustee shall consider the public interest in
addition to the interests of the debtor, creditors, and equity security holders." Id.
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